W dziale tym prezentujemy obecnie wybrane raporty i publikacje organizacji międzynarodowych i pozarządowych dotyczące tematyki regulacji działalności lobbingu, w których znajduje się szereg rekomendacji dot. jej kształtu. Publikacje te dotyczą zarówno sytuacji w Polsce, jak i Europie.

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    Lobbying – a risk or an opportunity? Lobbying regulation in the Polish, Slovak, and Czech perspective

    Raport stanowi podsumowanie projektu Inviting stakeholders to the process of monitoring anti-corruption legislation and policies in Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia realizowanego przez Fundację, dzięki wsparciu Komisji Europejskiej.

    Raport w pierwszym rozdziale próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytanie czym jest lobbing, w drugim przedstawia historię regulacji lobbingu w Polsce, Czechach i na Słowacji, w trzecim porównuje polską ustawę o działalności lobbingowej w procesie stanowienia prawa z projektami ustaw czeskich i słowackich oraz regulacjami obowiązującymi w Unii Europejskiej, zaś w czwartym prezentuje szereg rekomendacji, które mogą posłużyć do wprowadzenia regulacji zwiększającej transparentność lobbingu. Raport koncentruje się przede wszystkim na takich zagadnieniach jak definicja lobbingu i lobbysty, rejestr lobbingowy, prawa i obowiązki lobbysty oraz lobbowanego podmiotu, regulacja zapobiegająca zjawisku drzwi obrotowych, regulacja śladu legislacyjnego (legislative footprint) oraz sankcje.

    W przygotowaniu jest polskojęzyczne wydanie raportu.

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    Fundacja Batorego - Czy możliwy jest przejrzysty lobbing?

    Raport jest analizą lobbingu w Polsce i próbą oceny tego, w jakiej mierze przeciętny obywatel może mieć dostęp do informacji o tym, kto wpływa na decyzje publiczne (przejrzystość), czy wpływ ten zachowuje standardy etyczne po stronie zarówno lobbujących, jak i lobbowanych (uczciwość) i czy istnieje wystarczająco szeroka przestrzeń, w której jest możliwe zgłaszanie swoich potrzeb i interesów (równość dostępu). Główny wniosek, do którego dochodzimy, sprowadza się do stwierdzenia, że we wszystkich trzech aspektach – mimo istniejących regulacji – sytuacja jest dalece niezadowalająca i wymaga pilnej interwencji.

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    Fundacja Batorego - Czekając na otwarte rządy. Raport otwarcia Koalicji na rzecz Otwartego Rządu

    Koalicja na rzecz Otwartego Rządu postanowiła monitorować realizację rządowej strategii Sprawne Państwo 2020, w której zapisano najwięcej planów działań dotyczących bezpośrednio celów Partnerstwa na rzecz Otwartych Rządów. Przygotowanie „bilansu otwarcia” jest pierwszym działaniem w ramach wspomnianego monitoringu. W raporcie opisano stan prawnoinstytucjonalny i praktykę działań w czterech obszarach kluczowych dla idei otwartego rządu:

    • dostęp do informacji publicznej,
    • otwartość danych publicznych,
    • polityka antykorupcyjna,
    • otwartość procesów decyzyjnych

    poddając krytycznej analizie sytuację w wymienionych obszarach, w wymiarze zarówno wymagań stawianych przez Partnerstwo na rzecz Otwartych Rządów, jak i obietnic zawartych w strategii Sprawne Państwo 2020.

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    Transparency International - Lobbying in Europe

    This report examines the practice of lobbying and the attempts to regulate it in 19 European countries and within the three core EU institutions. It comes at a time when public trust in government is at an all-time low and the practice of lobbying is widely associated with secrecy and unfair advantage. It also comes at a moment when an increasing number of governments in Europe are promising to tackle the problem of undue influence in politics, and the need for good government is particularly pressing given the range of economic, social and political challenges currently faced by European countries and EU institutions.

    Lobbying is an integral part of a healthy democracy, closely related to universal values such as freedom of speech and the right to petition of government. It allows for various interest groups to present their views on public decisions that may come to affect them. It also has the potential to enhance the quality of decision-making by providing channels for the input of expertise on increasingly technical issues to legislators and decision makers.

    Despite this, multiple scandals throughout Europe demonstrate that without clear and enforceable rules, a select number of voices with better resourcing and contacts can come to dominate political decision-making.

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    Transparency International - 7,000 and counting. Lobby meetings of the European Commission

    Transparency International EU has published new analysis of lobbying in Brussels on 1 December 2015. It reveals that the overwhelming majority of lobby meetings held by European Commissioners and their closest advisors are with representatives of corporate interests. This is just one of the findings from our lobby monitoring tool available at:

    www.integritywatch.eu

    The tool provides a ‘one-stop shop’ for information published by the European Commission on meetings with lobbyists since December 2014. For the first time this information has been linked to data from the EU lobbying register to provide the most comprehensive overview of Brussels lobbying to date.

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    Transparency International - Access all areas: when EU politicians become lobbyists

    Our report finds that many of those leaving the EU institutions and specifically politics now have activities where risks of conflicts of interest cannot be ruled out. Most worrying are those situations where senior decision-makers from the EU move directly into positions where they seek to influence former colleagues or their staff or join organisations they have previously regulated. If the EU is to uphold its self-proclaimed role as an international champion in ethics rules leading international best practices, then much a stronger and more developed ethics framework is needed for managing the revolving door phenomenon.

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    OECD - Transparency and integrity in lobbying

    Concerns over lobbying practices and demands for transparency in public decision making have led to countries increasingly discussing lobbying in the political and policy arena. Lobbying can provide decision-makers with valuable insights and data, as well as grant stakeholders access to the development and implementation of public policies. However, lobbying can also lead to undue influence, unfair competition and regulatory capture to the detriment of the public interest and effective public policies. A sound framework for transparency in lobbying is therefore crucial to safeguard the integrity of the public decision-making process.

    The OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying have helped decision makers address concerns raised by lobbying practices. These are the only international principles addressing concerns raised by lobbying and providing guidance on how to meet expectations of transparency and accountability in the public decision-making process. They are part of the OECD strategy for a stronger, fairer and cleaner economy.

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    OECD - Lobbyists, Government and Public Trust. Volume 1. Increasing transparency through legislation

    This report is a review of the experiences of OECD countries to shed light through legislation and government regulation on the “mystery” of lobbying. The report draws upon research from and consultation with OECD member countries and other stakeholders conducted during 2007 and 2008. The results of the OECD survey on lobby regulations, the comparative overview and the country studies were discussed with the officials in charge of designing and implementing legislation and government regulations on lobbying at the OECD Special Session on Lobbying* in June 2007 in Paris. Consultations were carried out in autumn 2007 with government representatives in OECD countries and then in spring 2008 to obtain the views of stakeholders, businesses, lobby associations, trade unions, professional associations, civil society organisations, academics, international organisations and the governments of non-OECD countries with lobbying legislation. The Special Session and consultations confirmed a strong interest in bringing together lessons learned to develop guidance that could support the policy debate. The resulting guidance together with a comparative review of existing legislation and regulations for enhancing transparency in lobbying consist of key parts of this report.

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    OECD - Lobbyists, government and public trust: Promoting integrity by self-regulation

    This report examines self-regulation and regulation of the lobbying profession in an effort to rein in the perception or reality of undue influence-peddling, with a particular emphasis on experiences in Europe. The authors begin with a theoretical analysis of the nature of lobbying and its value to democratic governance. Lobbying serves a necessary and useful function in democratic governance. Even though the profession is based in the private sector, the purpose of lobbying is exclusively to influence public policies, making it unique from all other private-sector enterprises. Lobbying ultimately serves a governmental function, which cannot be said of any other business. In their role of creating a bridge between the private and the public sector, lobbyists and public officials instinctively relate according to the “reciprocity principle”, in which lobbyists providing needed research, gifts or other items of value help create a sense of obligation on behalf of appreciative public officials. This unique nature and relationship between lobbyists and public officials alone warrants special transparency requirements not due others in the private sector.

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    Rada Europy - Transparency and openness in European institutions

    The Assembly calls on the European Union to step up its co-operation with the Council of Europe in the fight against corruption, in particular by speeding up the negotiations on European Union participation in GRECO. It also calls on the European Union institutions to take their decisions as openly as possible. For this purpose, the Assembly recommends that the European Union institutions:

    • implement the European Ombudsman’s recommendations on transparency, on avoiding conflicts of interest and on ensuring access to documents;
    • further improve the Joint Transparency Register, by expanding it to all institutions of the European Union, making registration of lobbyists obligatory and introducing sanctions for nonregistration and for providing inaccurate data;
    • publish legislative footprints in order to track any input received from third parties aimed at influencing European Union legislation and policies;
    • amend the European Parliament’s Code of Conduct by introducing “cooling-off” periods for departing members in order to avoid conflicts of interest;
    • revise Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents in order to expand it to other European Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.
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    GRECO - Thirteenth general activity report (2012). Thematic article: Lobbying and corruption

    When it comes to assessing the scale of lobbying, the figures speak for themselves. At the end of October 2012, there were 5 431 registrants in the European Commission/European Parliament Joint Transparency Register of interest representatives. On average, five people are represented by each registrant, meaning 27 000 interest representatives had signed up to the Code of Conduct governing their activities in Brussels. In the US Congress, the number of lobbyists reportedly stands at 34 000.

    The term “lobby” refers to the hallways of the UK Houses of Parliament, where in the 19th century representatives of various groups would gather to meet with members of parliament. The existence of such channels in the Anglo-Saxon world is doubtless an acknowledgement of the importance of civil society and its major contribution to the decision-making process. Alexis de Tocqueville invoked the tyranny of the majority to confer legitimacy on the groups: “in aristocratic nations, secondary bodies form natural associations that hold abuses of power in check.” […]

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    GRECO - Fourth evalutaion round. Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. Evaluation report. Poland

    On the whole the approach in Poland to the issues addressed in the Fourth Evaluation Round is quite impressive. It would appear that the Polish authorities take the issue of corruption prevention in respect of Members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors seriously and should be commended for this. The specific reservations expressed in the present report must be read in the context of this positive overall impression. No fundamental changes are required in Poland, but there is still room for improvement to the current anti-corruption measures.

    […]

    Therefore, given the preceding paragraphs, GRECO recommends that interactions by parliamentarians with lobbyists and other third parties who seek to influence the legislative process, be made more transparent, including with regard to parliamentary sub-committee meetings.

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    GRECO - Fourth evalutaion round. Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. Compliance report. Poland

    GRECO takes note of the information provided, according to which a bill amending the legislation on lobbying and draft amendments to the Rules of Procedure concerning senators have been prepared. It would appear that these proposals are aimed at widening the scope of the rules on lobbying – which in their present form primarily focus on requirements on lobbyists themselves – to regulate also the conduct expected from deputies and senators vis-à-vis lobbyists. While such moves go in the direction recommended, GRECO regrets that the reform is still at a very early stage and, in addition, that no amendments to the Rules of Procedure concerning Sejm deputies have even been drafted. Regarding the draft amendments to the Rules of Procedure concerning senators, the authorities may wish to further refine the quite succinct draft rules (e.g. by introducing a timeframe for the disclosure requirement on senators). It is clear that much more needs to be done to fulfil the requirements of the recommendation.

    GRECO concludes that recommendation i has not been implemented.